Arsalan Aghakhani; Seyed Mohammadreza Hoseini Beheshti; shamsolmolouk Mostafavi
Abstract
Immanuel Kant's aesthetics in Critique of Judgment has always been the subject of discussions and the discovery of many points about the anatomy of the faculty of Taste and its judgments. Because of contemporary aesthetic issues, the inquiry concerning the possibility of the reflective perception ...
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Immanuel Kant's aesthetics in Critique of Judgment has always been the subject of discussions and the discovery of many points about the anatomy of the faculty of Taste and its judgments. Because of contemporary aesthetic issues, the inquiry concerning the possibility of the reflective perception of dissatisfaction and following that the position of ugliness in Kant’s aesthetics has been considered by commentators. Ugliness and its judgments have different places in Kant's pre-critical philosophy in comparison with his ideas in the framework of the critical system. Before writing triple critiques, he has taken note of Ugliness in the format of sensorial perceptions and anthropological concepts as the object of merely empirical positive displeasure perception. But the query about Ugliness as a reflective judgment is impossible on his critical aesthetic horizon because the possibility of such a judgment would be contradictory with the systematic purposes and methodology of the third critique. In order to clarify the position of Ugliness in Kant's aesthetic horizon, while the present article examines his view on Ugliness in the pre-critical horizon, it explains the reasons for the absence of the Ugly as a reflective judgment in Kant's critical considerations and proves the impossibility of realizing the reflective judgment on Ugliness in transcendental philosophy.
